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testator's death. Especially is this so, when, as in the will .under
consideration, it appears clearly to have been the intent of the
testator that the legacy should be paid by a transfer of bonds
and mortgages bearing interest at the time of his death. All
the authorities and dicta concur, that under such circumstances
the accruing interest upon the securities, from the time of the
death of the testator, should go for the use and maintenance of
the beneficiary. It' follows from these considerations, that the
order of the General Term granting a new trial should be affirmed
with costs, and in pursuance of the ddfendants' stipulation, judgment absolute should be -rendered for the plaintiff, and the
Supreme Court is directed to ascertain the amount due to the
plaintiff on the principles of this opinion, and render judgment
therefor with costs.
All concurred except GROVER, J., who dissented, and PORTER,
J., who, having been of counsel, took no part.
Judgment affirmed.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF EXECUTION..

Proof of Identity.-Legal proof of the identity of the persons appearing before an officer for the purpose of acknowledging the execution
of an instrument, is necessary, when the officer has no previous knowledge of them. A mere introduction, at the time, is not sufficient:
Jones et al. v. Bach et al., 48 Barb.
When this previous knowledge does not exist, the officer must take
satisfactory evidence, under the solemnity of an oath or fofmal affirmation, of the identity of such persons: Id.
'ARBITRATION.

Agreement to submit to-Iguidated Damages.-An agreement, under
IFrom J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 5 Wallace's Reports.
9 From Hon. Charles Allen, Reporter; to appear in 13 Allen's Reports.
3 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear In 48 Barbour's Reports.
4From P. F. Smith, Esq., State Reporter; to appear in 53 Pa. State Rep.
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seal, of submission to arbitration provided that either party who slwuld
fail to perform the award should forfeit to the other a certain sum, and
that each party should get - a surety for the faithful payment thereof.
By a separate agreement not under seal, but on the same paper and
made on the same day, another person. guaranteed the performance of
the award, on the part of one of the parties, and the payment of the
penalty, in case he should refuse to perform the same.. Reld, that the
prineipal and guarantor could not be joined in one action, under G(on.
Sts. . 129, §4: Wallis V. Carpenter,13 Allen.
A submission, under seal, to arbitration, can only be revoked by an
instrument under seal: Id.
Simply proving that an arbitrator was a creditor of one of the parties
is not sufficient to invalidate his award: Id.
If. two persons who havo been partners together submit to arbitration
all matters between them,and after the commencement of the hearing
.they and another person with whom they had'formed a partnership for,
transacting a portion of their business submit t the same arbitrators all
partnership matters remaining unsettled between them, and under the'
.second submission an award is made fixing a sum as due from the'two
original partilers to such third person, the arbitrators may take such
award int& consideration in determining the matters in controversy
between the original partners, and may award that one of them shall pay
the amount thereof to such third person: Id.
"An agreement of submission to arbitration provided that either party
who should fail to performi the award should 'forfeit to the other party
the sum of fifteen hundred dollars as liquidated damages!' By a separate agreement, another person guaranteed the'performance of the award,
on the part of one of the parties, and agreed to "pay the penalty of
fifteen hundred dollars,'? in case he should refuse to perform the same.
Reid, that the sum of fifteen hundred dollars wan to be treated as a
penalty, in each agreement, and not as liquidated damages: Id.
ASSUMPSIT.

Paro.1 Promise.-During the raid 'of 1863, whilst the citizens., of
Pittsburgh were engaged in building defences, the defendant promised
the plaintiff,'also a citizen, that if he would work on them he would pay
him. Not.withstanding the circumstances, the plaintiff was, not bound
to work gratuitously, and the defendant was liable on his promise: Smith
v. McKenna, 53 Penna.
This promise was not to answer the debt.or default of another; it was
an independent undertaking by the defendant on his own account, and
writing was not necessary to make it valid: Id.
DEBToR AND CREDITOn.
Vested Remainder.-An estate in vested remainder is liable to debts
the same as one in possession: Nicho l v. Levy, 5 Wall. - .
Hence, where creditors seek to subject, by bill in equityto their
claims an estate in such vested remainder, and it is decided that they
cannot do it, the matter will be considered-as res adudcata,if they
afterwards try to levy, by execution, on the same property; when, by th,
death of the-tenant for life, it has become an estate in possession: Uc.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
EQUITY.

lnjuntion.-The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve
the subject of the controversy in the condition in which it is when the
order is made. It cannot be used to take property from one party and
put it into" the possession of another; this can be done only by a final
decree: _armers' Railroad Co. v. Reno, &c., Railway Co., 53 Penna.
A preliminary injunction cannot be used to harass or punish a defendant without benefit to the complainant: Id.
Interference by Ijunction with inferior Tribunals.-With the proceedings and determinations of inferior boards or tribunals of special
jurisdiction, courts of equity will not interfere, unless it should become
iecessary to prevent a multiplicity of stilts or irreparable injury, or
unless the proceeding sought to be annulled or corrected is valid upon
its -face, and the alleged invalidity consists in matters to be established
by extrinsic evidence. In other cases the review and correction of the
proceedings must be obtained by the writ of certiorari:-Ewingv. City
of St. Louis, 5 Wall.
Therefore, to a bill filed to enjoin the -enforcement of certain judgments rendered 'against the complainant by the mayor of St."Louis for
the amount of alleged benefit to his property from the opening of a
street in that city, and setting forth, as grounds of relief, want of authority in the mayo.r, and various defects and irregularities in the proceedings, a dlemurrer on the ground that a court of equity had no jurisdiction of the matter, and that the complainant had a plain, adequate, and
complete remedy at law, was sustained: Id.
A non-resident complaiiant can ask no greater relief in the courta
of the United States than he could obtain were he to resort to the state
courts. If, in the latter courts, equity would aford no relief, neither
will it in the former: Id.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.

Investment in Land. -If a guardian of minor children uses'his wards'
*money to purchase land, and takes a deed acknowledging the receipt of
the consideration paid by him, "guardian of the'minor children" of- A.,
but running to himself, his heirs and assigns, without otherwise referrinig
to his guardianship, this is sufficient to give riotice to creditors of the
guardian that the land is held by him in trust; and parol evidence is
competent to show that in fact the land was purchased with the wards'
money: 'Bancroft v. Consen, 13 Allen.
The fact that a guardian has wrongfully invested his wards' money
in real estate will not render such real estate liable to be seized on execution by his creditors: 1d.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

.Married oman-Donatio causa mortis.-A married woman has
power under our statutes to make a valid disposition of specific articles
of her separate personal property by a donatio causa mortis, without her
husband's consent: Marshall v. Berry, 13 Allen.
Tenancy by Entireties.-The recent statutes of New York for the
better protection -of the separate property of married women, have no
relation to, or effect upon, real estate conveyed to husband and wife
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jointly: The Farmer': and Mechanics' National Bank of Rochester v.
Gregory and Wife, 48 Barb.
In such a case the wife has no separate estate, but is seised, with her
husband, of the entirety; neither having any separate or severable part
or portion, but the two, as one in law, holding the entire estate: Id.
They hold thus not as joint tenants, or as tenants in common, but as
tenants by entireties; and the same words of conveyance which would
make two other persons joint tenants will make the husband and wie
tenants of the entirety: Id.
Wherd the estate thus held by them is voluntarily converted into
money, the same belongs to the husband exclusively, in virtue of his
marital rights. And no rule of equity will give the wife the entire
amount, as her sep.rate property, to the exclusion of the rights of the
hfu§band and of his creditors: Id.
In a case where there never was any separate estate or right in -the
wife, neither the statutes nor the rules of equity, are sufficient.to enable
her to appropriate the entire property to herself, -to the exclusion of the
husband's creditorsi' although they became such during the joint
ownership: Id.
INSURANCE.

By !r uste&--Pyment to a Creditor.-Oneof five trustees of a church
edifice, being the agent of an insurance company, accepted a risk in it
from another of the trustees to whom the church was indebted, the
policy being in the individual name of the insuring trustee, with a proviso that in case of loss the amount should be paid to i. creditor of him
the insuring'trustee, to whom, however, the -church was not indebted.
The insuring trustee paid the premiums out-'of his own funds biut on
account of the parish, and with the assent of the trustees ; and -thefact
of two previous insurances in other companies, where the insurance was
made in the name of the proprietors of the church generally, was recited
in this policy made in the individual name of the one trustee. A: lss
having occurredHeld, that the creditor of the insuring trustee 'Was entitled to recover
on the policy; the case showing that the insurance in the form in which
it was made, was madewith the assent of all the trustees, and it-being a
matter immaterial to the company (supposing the risk to be the sime)
whether the person- app6inted by the insuring trustee to receive th'e
money retained it to his own use or 'aid it to the trustees: Insurance
Co. v. Chase, 5 Wall.
LEGAL TENDER NOTES.

Cusfom of Bankers to pay special De)osits in Con.-A customer of
certain bankers atWashington, D. C., in tim4s when, specie payments
having been lately suspended, coin was acquiring one value and currency
(paper money)-another aid less, deposited with them both coin and paper
money; the different deposits being entered in his pass-book, th6 one as
"coin" the other as "currency," &c. Debts being at this time payable
by law only in coin, the bankers requested their customer to make -is
full balance coin, which he did. Congress passed, about eight months
afterwards, an act making -certain treasury nbtes lawful money for the
payment of debts. The depositor went on, depositing "coin," and "treasury notes" then regarded as currency, and both were entered accord,.
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ingly. He afterwards drew for "1coin," for a part of his deposit, and
his check was paid in coin. He afterwards drew-for icoin,"-the bulk
of his coin balance. Coin was refused and tender made of the treasury
notes, declared by Congress a legal tender. On suit brought to recover
the market value of the coin drawn for-the bank teller having testified
among other things. that "after the suspension, and particularly after the
act making treasury notes a legal tender, his employers uniformly made
with customers depositing with them a difference, in receiving and paying their deposits, between coin or specie and paper money, and in all
cases when the deposit was in coin they paid the checks of their customers in coin when they called for coin, otherwise they paid currency,
treasury or bank notes"--the plaintiff offered evidence to show "that
the usage and -mode of dealing between the said parties as set out in the
testimony of the teller was uniformly used and practised by all the banks
and bankers of the District of Columbia with their customers :"Reld, that the evidence was rightly excluded: Thompson v. Biggs,
5 Wall.
LICENSE.

Under iternaZ Revenue .dcts-A -Mode of,Taxation on1&/.Z-Licenses
under the Act of June 30th 1864, "to provide internal revenue to support the government, &c." (13 Stat. at Large 223), and the amendatory
acts, conveyed tp the licensee no authority-to carry on the licensed business within a state: License Tax Cases, 5 Wall.
The requirement of payment for such licenses is only a mode of imposing taxes on the licensed business, and the prohibition, under penalties, against carrying on the business without license is only a mode of
enforcing the. payment of such taxes: Id.
The provisions of the Act of Congress requiring such licenses, and
imposing penalties for not taking out and paying for them, are not contrary ,to the Constitution or to public policy: Id.
The provisions in the Act of July 13th 1866, "to reduce internal
taxation, &." (14 Stat. at Large 93), for the imposing of spdcial taxes,
in lieu of requiring payment for licenses, removes whatever ambiguity
existed in the previous laws, and are in harmoiny 'with the Constitution
and public policy: Id.
The recognition by the Acts of Congress of:the power and right of
the states to tax, control, or regulate any business carried on within their
limits is entirely consistent with an intention on-the part of Congress to
tax such business for natiohal purposes: Id.
A license from the Federal government, under the Internal Revenue
Acts of Congress, is no bar to an indictment under a state law p"ohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors. The License Tax Cases, ' supra,
affirmed: Pervearv. The Commonwealth, 5 Wall.
A law of a state taxing or prohibiting a business already taxed by
Congress, as ex. gr., the keeping and sale of intoxicating liquors -Congress having declared that its imposition of a tax should not be taken to
abridge the power of the state to tax or prohibit the licensed business,is not unconstitutional: Id.
LUNATIC.

Inquisition-Burden of Proof.-An inquisition finding that a party
is a lunatic or habitual drunkard, is prima facie evidence of incompe-
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tency at any time covered by the finding, and the burden is upon the
party setting up a contract of the lunatic or habitual drunkard to show
that he was sane at its execution: Noel v. Xarper, 53 Penna.
In such case it must be shown that the lunatic or habitual drunkard
had memory and judgment enough to understand the character of the
act, and the legal responsibility entailed thereby: Id.
The presumption'in favor of sanity is changed by the fact that there
was.such inquisition: Id..
Proof of fixed habits of intemperance for two years -would not, aside
from such finding, shift the burden of proof so as to reqciire the party
setting up the contract to prove competency at the time-of its execution: rd.
MARRiIAG

AND DIvouOE.

Jurisdiction.-TheSupreme Court has no inherent power to declare a
marriage contract void, or t6 decree fLlimited or an absolute divorce.
Whatever power it pssesses is given by statute; anui it can exercise no
power, on- the subject of divorce, except what is expressly specified in
the statute: Penguet v. Phelpi, 48 Barb. The court has no jurisdiction to declare a'marriage void on the ground
that a decree for. divorce was obtained against the defendant by. her
former. husband for adultery.; in which decree she was forbidden to
marry again until her said husband should be 'dead; and that in disokedien'ce'of this provision she and the present plaintiff went to another
-state and were there marred: Id.
.
'
NE~raGENo.

Death from Negli . ce-Damqags--'A ailroad company, whi6b
grants the use of its road to another company, is responsible for accidents
ciused to passengers which ig itself cafries, by the negligence of the
trains of the other company thus running by its permission: Railroad
(o. v. Barron, 5 Wall.
When a statute-giving a right of action-to the ej ecutor of a person
killed by such an- act as would, if death had not: ensued, entitle such
person to maintain an action for damages-provides, that- the amount
recovered shall be for the exclusiv'e benefit of the widow, and, ne.x of
kin, in the proportion provided by law in- the distribution of personal
property left by persons dying intestate; and that "in every such acti6n
the jury may give damages as thei shall deem a fair and just compensation with reference to pecuniary injuries resulting from such death, &c.,
not exceeding, &c.,"-itis not n~cessarr to the recovery that the widow
and kin should have had a legal claim on the deceased, if he had survived, for their support: d.
Semble, that 8tatutes of this kind are enacted, as respects the measure
of damages, upon the-.idea that as a general fact the personal assets of
the deceased would take the direction given them by the law governing
the case of intestates. Hence any damages 'given must, as. a" general
thing, be so distributed, even though the party hav.e left'a will not so
devoting his property: -d.
The damages in these cases must depend very much upon all the facts
and circumstances of the particular case. -And as when the' suit is
brought by-the party himself, for injuries to himself, there can be no
fixed measure of compensation for the pain and anguish of body -and
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mind, nor for the loss of time and care in business, or the permanent
injury to health and body, so when it is brought by the representative
for his death the pecuniary injury resulting from the death to the next
of kin is equally uncertain and indefinite. In the latter and more difficult case, as in the former one, often difficult hliso, the result must be
left to turn mainly upon the sound sense and deliberate judgment of the
jury, applied, as above stated, to all the facts and circumstances: Id.
NUISANCE..

Damage to an Inn b Aoise and Jarringof Afahinery.-In an action'
to recover damages to an inn, from a nuisance, by carrying on works and
-operating machinery in the neighborhood, which shook the building and
prevented guests from sleeping, evidence is incompetent on the part of
the plaintiff to show that frequently guests, on leaving the inn at night
and seeking other lodgings, declared that they did so because they were
prevented from sleeping by the jar. And evidence is incompetent on
the part of the defendants to show that, in the opinion of witnesses who
were familiar with the. locality, and who had bought, sold, and let real
estate in the vicinity, the effect of the stopping of the defendants' works
would'be to diminish materially the value of the plaintiff's premises for
occupation, although the plaintiff has introduc6d evidence to show that
operating the defendants' works has diminished the rentable value of his
premises: Wess6n v. Washburn Iron Co., 13 Allen.
An action may be maintained to recover damages for a nuisance to a
dwelling-house, caused by carrying on works and operating machinery
in the vicinity, which fill the air with smoke and cinders, and -render it
offensive or injurious to health, and shake the building so as to injure
it and render its occupation uncomfortable, although all persons owning
estates in the vicinity have sustained similar injuries from the same
cause. It is only when the nuisance complained of is an invasion of
some' common or public. right that the remedy is confined to a public*
prosecution: Id.
PLEADING.

Negatire Pleas.-The plea "covenants performed absque hoc, &.," is
a negative plea in part at least; the words "absque ?wc" introducing a
negation after an affirmative inducement: Smith v. Frazier,53 Penna.
It contains an averment that the defendant has performed his covenants, and a denial that the plaintiff had performed his; throwing the
burden of showing perforniance on the plaintiff, who is therefore entitled
to the conclusion to the jury: d.
RAILROAD COMrPANIES.

Acts and Admissions of Agents.-An agent of a railroad corpration,
he.ving charge of a depot, and the freight therein, is the proper person
to inquire of respecting lost baggage; and his answer is part of the evidence of the loss, and admissible as res gest: CJurtis v. The Avon,
Genesee, &c., Railroad Co., 48 Barb.
So, in regard to an arrangement between a passenger and the baggage
master, at a station, that the baggage of the former may remain at the*
depot, and that the latter will see to it, until it can be sent for: id.
Evidence in Actions against.-In an action 'by a passenger, against a

-
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railroad company, to recover for lost baggage, evidence to show that the
passenger was lame and unable to take charge of his baggitge, personally,
is admissible, as tending to prove that he was guilty of no negligence in
iiot calling for and taking charge of his baggage upon the arrival at his
place of'destination; anld as furnishing a good reason for making an
arrangement with the agents of the railroad companj that it should
remain in the custody of the company until called for: Id.
Liabilty for lost Buggage.-Where a passenger, on arriving at his
4 destinatioir, neglects to look after his baggage and iiegligently leaves it,
without any arrangement that the carrier shall'retain it forhim, and it
is lost while thus situated, without fault on the part of the carrier, the
latter is not liable: Id.
But where there is no delivery of baggage carried upon a railroad, to
the passenger, and no neglect to claim it or inquire for it, but on the
contrary the company's agents agree to retain it until it can be seit for,
the company's liability, as a common carrier, continues after the. baggage
is taken from the cars and until it is delivered or tendered to the owner:
Id.
STREiM.
Use by Owner of Land.-The owner of land, through which a natural
stream of' water passes, has no right to use the water for such purposes
as will corrupi it, to the material injury of the riparian own6rs below:
.feri-field v. Lombard, 13 Allen.
Rights of Owner of Land.-The owner of land boidering upon a
stream may lawfully dig a canal upon his own land which'will prevent it
from being flowed b' the erection or raising of a dam below, if he does'
not theieby divert the water from its natural course; and the fact that
the owner below has already beguh to build or raise his dam is immaterial: Storm v. Manchaug Co. and Others, 13 Allen.
SURETY.

Negligence of Creditor.-To exempt'a surety from liabiliiy by reason
of the neglect and refusal of the creditor to collect the debt of the principal debtor while he was solvent, althbugh requested to do so by the
surety, it must be shown that the creditor was requested to enforce the
collection of -the debt 6i dueprocess of.law. Nothing short of that,'in
such a case, will exonerate the surety: Singer v. Troutman, 48 Barb.
Where the request was that the creditor should "1push" the principal
debtor, "and keep pushing him :" ield,'that the words used had not
the same legal significance as the words "prosecute or collect;" that to
give those terms the same legal significance, it was- necessary not only
that the creditor shon'ld have understood them in that sense, but that
the surety should have meant and intended that, also: Id.
The terms in which such a request are made are not material, but they
should be unequivocal and clearly and plainly intended and understool
as a request to collect by prosecution; .d.
TAXATION.
Exemption on account of Militar1 y Service.-The property of a married woman is hot relieved from taxations for bounties, by the exemption
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:f her husband on account of military service: Crawford v. Burrell
Township, 53 Penna.
The exemption of the soldier is a personal privilege, and- does not
exempt the wife of a living soldier: Id.
TELEGRAPH COMPANY.

Power to make Regulations-lessagenot repeated.-Inthis Commonwealth, telegraph companies may limit the measure of their liability to
damages for errors in the transmission of messages, by reasonable rules
and regulations, brought home to the knowledge of the parties interested
therein: Ellis v. American Telegraph Co., 13 Allen.
If a message is received by a telegraph company for transmission from
one point to another in this Commonwealth, written upon a blank which
contains, as a part of the terms and conditions upon which all messages
are received by them for transmission, a statement that every important
message should be repeated, by being sent back from the station at which
it is to be received to the station from which it is originally sent, for
which repetition half the usual price will be charged, and that they will
not be responsible for any error in the transmission of any unrepeated
message beyond the amount paid for sending the same, unless a special
agreement for insuring the same lie made in writing, and if an error
occurs in transmitting the same, and the same is not asked to be repeated,
and the message as erroneously transmitted is written upon a blank containing the same terms and conditions above referred to, and in that
form is delivered to the person.to whom it is addressed, such person so
receiving the same cannot maintain an action against the cdmpany to
recover greater damages than the amount paid .for sending the same,
without some further proof of carelessness or negligence on their part
than that resulting simply from the error: Id.
TENANTS IN COMiMiON.

Accounting between.-One tenant in common, although he have the
exclusive possession of the common property, is not liable to account to
the other tenants in common either for rent or for a share of the profits,
unless there be an express agreement that he shall do so: Wilcox, Ad.
ministratrix, &c., v. Wilcox et al., 48 Barb.
Liabilitjof Husbandfor Rent.-Where a married woman is a tenant
in common with others, of property occupied by her and her husband,
his occupation being that of his wife, no action will lie against him by
the other tenants in common, for rent, without proof of an agreement
to pay it: Id.
USURY.

M1ode of Pleading.-Where usury is set up as a defence the usurious
contract should be so pleaded that it may appeat what rate or amount of
interest was taken or secured, and on what sum, and for what time:
and the answer should show a corrupt intent: The NationalBank of the
.Metropolis v. Orenth, 48 Barb.
When these facts appear from the terms of the answer, nothing further
is necessary to make it sufficiently definite: Id.
If the answer avers that the plaintiff discounted the drafts sued on

